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tion as well results of different forms of referenda. 
Resume
Nous presentons une theorie positive de la centralisation des decisions politiques. 
Les electeurs choisissent la forme d'organisation des services publics qui favorisent les 
politiques qu'ils preforent. Nous etudions les preferences induites pour la centralisation 
et comparons les resultats de differentes formes de consultations populaires. 
Keywords: voting, unification, decentralization 
JEL Classification number: 025, 320, 940 
ECONOMICS RESEARCH LIBRARY 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote 
Jacques Cremer Thomas R. Palfrey 
1 Introduction 
Political bodies often must choose whether or not to adopt a single centralized policy on 
an issue. This paper investigates some of the factors that determine how this centraliza­
tion question is decided. We focus on a single but important dimension of this question, 
the tradeoffs faced by a collection of small component political entities (which we will 
call districts) between maintaining a sovereign right to shape policies such as education, 
the environment, or social conduct, specifically tailored to local needs and preferences, 
versus the alternative of agreeing to follow uniform (across districts) policies along each 
of these different dimensions. We call such a committment to policy uniformity across a 
subset of districts centralization.1 
Contrary to most of the economic
 'it�rat�r� o� this topic o�r· approach is positive. 
We do not discuss the efficiency of c.entralization, but focus exclusively on the "preference; 
aggregation" problem inherent in centralization. Therefore in our model, all outcomes! 
are Pareto optimal, but the policy will depend on the le-yel of centralization. In the 
centralized case all districts will have the same policy. In the totally decentralized case 
each different district will adopt a different policy, and the distribution of these policies, 
adopted under majority rule can vary considerably. Voters will vote for the allocation of 
responsibilities to the level of government which is the most likely to choose the policy 
they prefer. Under these conditions, our aim is to predict the outcome of a referendum 
on centralization. In order to do so we will have to study the induced preferences for or 
against centralization, which depend on the distribution of policy preferences across all 
districts. 
The model excludes from consideration efficiency issues relating to centralization, such 
as economies (or diseconomies) of scale in the production of public goods and services, 
networking externalities, benefits from coordination and standardization. 2 These are 
1This is closely related theoretically to the problem of confederation of several states under a unified 
constitution. The results carry over to that setting. 
2For recent discussions of some of these normative issues see 'Oates [1972), Sinn [1993), Cremer, 
Estache and Seabright [1993) and the references they cite. 
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important factors which often seem to favor centralization. 3 We exclude them from our 
model because they would confound the pure "preference aggregation" effect on induced 
preferences for centralization. 
In our analysis, districts and unions are composed of individuals; these individuals 
have diverse preferences over the various policy issues that are decided by governments; 
and there is some correlation between the tastes of individuals that belong to the same 
district. Consequently, the outcomes and policies decided at the decentralized level vary 
widely across the set of feasible alternative policies. These diverse preferences and wide 
range of decentralized outcomes imply that some individuals will be better off committing 
in advance to adhere to uniform policies, while others would prefer ·not to. The impetus
for centralization will be greater, and the pressures for fragmentation will be less, the 
larger the proportion of individuals that prefer committment to uniform policies. 
In our model, the main benefit of centralization is policy moderation: ·the policies of 
the union are close to the average of the policies of the districts. In addition, moderation 
will manifest itself in the fact that it is easier to predict a centralized policy than the 
policy of a district. At one extreme, the centralized policy is virtually certain to be 
at the ex ante median of the whole population of voters, while there is some variation 
across district medians. More generally, there will be less uncertainty about the union 
median than in the district medians. This policy moderation effect plays a key role in 
our analysis. 
In this way we obtain derived preferences for centralization as a function of a voter's 
type, which is determined by his ideal policy and the district to which he belongs. These 
derived preferences have a very simple et.ructure . .  Voters with extreme ideal policies prefer
decentralization; vot'ers with moderate idea:i"policies pref�r centralization. Voters are aiso
more likely to support centralization the larger the district to which they belong, and 
the closer to uniform the distribution of sizes of the other districts. 
Having characterized derived preferences, we will be able to study the relationship 
between the distribution of voter preferences and the likelihood of centralization. The 
answer depends on the level at which votes are aggregated. If votes are aggregated 
at the union level, centralization vote will rarely succeed. The expected percentage of 
"YES" votes for centralization is bounded above at only slightly more than fifty percent. 
Centralization is more likely when votes are aggregated at the district level, which is 
the institution more favored in the real world.4 The expected percentage of districts 
with majorities favoring centralization is greater than the expected percentage of the 
overall population favoring centralization, unless there is so much heterogeneity across 
districts that centralization has very little (expected) support. We call this the principle 
of aggregation. 
3This is not exclusively true-for example there may be inefficiencies associated with establishing a 
policy "monopoly" and there do exist problems of control of politicians that might be best resolved by 
decentralization. 
4For example, in the approval and amendment of national constitutions, and major international 
agreements such as the European agreement at Maastricht. 
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In the next section, we describe the model and characterize induced preferences for 
centralization. We also conduct some comparative statics on the number of districts and 
their size distribution. Section 3 compares voting procedures. We study the consequences 
of the method used to aggregate votes, and explains how the principle of aggregation 
applies to our model. Then, we explore the effect of an "opt out" provision that allows 
districts that vote against centralization to adopt their own separate policies. Section 4 
presents some extensions, and section 5 some concluding remarks. 
2 Basic results 
2.1 The model
A federation is composed of a finite set 'D of districts. In each district, there Is a continuum 
of individuals. For most of this paper, there is only one issue on which a policy is to be 
chosen, and the issue space is represented by the real line. 
Each individual has an ideal policy or point t, which we will also call his type. If 
policy x is adopted the utility of an individual of type t is 
U(x; t) = -(x - t)2• 
When voting over constitutions, the agent will be uncertain about the outcome. In 
this case, between two distributions over p.olicies he will choos� that distribution that 
maximizes his expected utility. 
An individual is represented by his type t and the district d to which he belongs.
Within district d, the types of the individuals are normally distributed with mean md and
varian_ce 1 (this normalization is harmless). The district means are normal independent 
random variables, normally distributed with mean 0 and variance a-J. Each individual 
only knows his type, the district to which he belongs, and the statistical distribution of 
preferences. 
The median type of the whole federation is5 
M _L admd,
dE'D 
where ad E (0, 1) is the relative size of district d; 
5Since each district has a continuum of voters, in this model the median is equal to the mean. 
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We assume that the political process within any district, in the case of decentraliza­
tion, or in the federation taken as a whole, in the case of centralization, yields a policy 
that is the ideal point of the median voter. Before a vote is taken on the policy, a vote 
on the centralization question is first taken. If centralization wins, then a single policy is 
taken for the whole federation. If centralization fails, each district adopts their median 
voter's ideal point. 
Individual ( t, d) votes for centralization if and only if his disutility under decentral­
ization is less than his disutility under centralization, that is if 
E[(t -md)2jt, d] � E[(t -M)2jt, d]. (1) 
Note that in general an individual's estimate of the mean of all types in the population 
will depend not only on his own type, but also of the district to which he belongs (more 
precisely on its size). 
2.2 Who votes for decentralization?
Let us first compute the left hand side of equation (1). Using standard results from De 
Groot ( 1970), chapter 5, one can easily prove that the distribution of md conditional on t
is normal with mean 
and variance 
This implies 
a2 d
a�+ 1 ·
E[(md -t)2jt,d] E [((md -E[mdlt,d]) + (E[mdlt,d] -t))2 jt,d]
E 
[ ( (md -E[mdlt, d]) + (a�/(l +a�) -l)t) 2 It, d]
- var(mdjt,d] + ( 
2 
1 ) 2 t2
ad+ 1 
"t!i + (,,J � S t2.
To compute the right hand side of equation (1) note fitst that t.he distribution of M 
conditional on t and dis Normal with mean 
4 
and variance: 
var [Mlt, d] 
where 
Therefore, the right hand side of (1) is equal to
E [(M -t)2jt,d] = E [(M -E[Mjt,d])2 + (E[Mlt,d] -t)21t,d] 
- var [Mlt, d] + (E [Mlt, d] -�)2 
uj(µ-�J) + O"J.µ · [(1_:ad)O"J+1]2 
1 + O"J 
+ 
(1 + O"J)2
• 
We can therefore rewrite equation (1) under the form
·which can be rewritten as:
t2 1 - µ -uJ(µ -a�) 
O"J + 1 � (1 -ad)((l -ad)O"J + 2) · 
(2) 
The denominator of the left hand side of (2) is the unconditional variance of the 
distribution of the type of an agent. Let us denote by q> the cumulative distribution 
function of the unit Normal. Equation (2) implies that the expected proportion of agents 
who favor decentralization in district d is · 
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when the right term is well defined. When it is not well defined, i.e., when the right hand 
side of equation (2) is negative, all agents in the district vote for centralization. 
Voters trade off the expected closeness of the median of their own district against the 
predictable moderation of the federation median, ,which is, unlikely to .be very far from 
/the most moderate policy 0. Therefore, extreme voters will tend to prefer decentralized 
outcomes (since moderation is bad from their point of view) whereas sufficiently moderate 
voters will value the predictable moderation of the federation median. 
Voters in large districts have better information about the federation median than 
voters in small districts. Moreover, a voter in a large district expects the median of the 
federation to be closer to his ideal point than a voter with identical preferences in a 
smaller district, since the large district median has a greater weight in determining the 
federation median. Formally: 
Proposition 1 For all t and for all d, d' such that ad > ad , if (t, d') weakly prefers 
centralization then ( t, d) strictly prefers centralization. 
Proof. The denominator of equation (2)"-is strictly decreasing in ad and its numerator is 
strictly increasing in ad. The result follows. I
We also have the following proposition: 
Proposition 2 If 
all agents in district d prefer decentralization. 
Proof. The denominator of the right hand side of equation (2) is positive. Its numerator 
is less than or equal to 0 if arid only if the inequality in this proposition is satisfied. Since 
all agents prefer decentralization if and only if the right hand side of (2) is less than or 
equal to 0, the result follows. I
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2.3 The effect of the size distribution of districts
In order to generate more insights on the determinants of votes for centralization and 
decentralization, it is useful to examine a few special cases. 
2.3.1 Equal sized districts 
Assume that the set Vis composed oLN dis�I"ki� with the same population. Then ad = 
l/N for all d, and equation (2) reduces to 
t2 
u2+1 d 
As N increases, for fixed aJ , the right hand side of (2.3.1) increases. Hence, with
equal-sized districts, an increase in the number of districts favors centralization. On the 
surface, this would seem to contradict Proposition 1, which states that it is the agents 
that belong to larger districts that are more likely to favor centralization. However, that 
proposition holds the distribution of ad's constant, whereas in the present analysis this
distribution changes as N changes. 
As N converges to infinity the right hand side of (2.3.1) converges to 
1 
The comparative statics are reasonable. The proportion of individuals favoring decen­
tralization increases with aJ . If aJ is large enough, all agents prefer decentralization since
the district variance swamps the idiosyncratic variance. As aJ converges to 0, the propor­
tion of agents who favor centralization converges from below to 2 ( 1 - <I> ( �)) � 0.52.
2.3.2 A dominant district and a fringe of many small districts 
With one very large district and many small ones of equal sizes, µwill be approximately 
equal to the square of the ·population share of the large district. :The proportion of the 
population of the small districts that will vote for decentralization is 
(3) 
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and the proportion of the population of the large district that will vote for decentralization 
IS 
2 [1 - iii ( .j 2 + {1 � µ)uJ ) l (4) 
From proposition 1, we know that the proportion of the population that favors decen­
tralization will be larger in the small districts. From (3) and (4), as µ  increases a larger 
proportion of the population of small districts and a smaller proportion of the population 
of the large district votes for decentralization. However, ·even ·if-IesS'-than -30 percent of 
the population belongs to the large district, at least 50 percent of the population of the 
small districts will vote for centralization, whatever O"J. Indeed, for any O-J > 0 
and the right hand side of this inequality is equal to .5 when µ is approximately equal 
to (.30) 2• 
These comparative statics make sense: not only are large districts more favorable 
to centralization, but small districts are more willing to centralize policy decisions with 
them the less dominant they are. 
3 Comparing voting procedures 
3.1 Aggregation of votes at the district level
Up to this point, the discussion has focussed on the preferences of agents for centraliza­
tion or decentralization. We have not described carefully the way in which votes were 
translated into a centralization decision. In this subsection we compare two types of 
procedures: 
• Under federated referendum procedures, votes are aggregated at the district level,
and centralization ·prevails if and only if-it is-favored· byi;he majority of districts;
• in contrast in general referendum procedures whichever centralization decision fa­
vored by the greater number of voters in the aggregate is chosen.
Federated referendum procedures are common practic� .in Western democracies when 
amending the constitution, for example. Representative institutions, such as parliaments 
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and congress, also typiqi.lly aggregate preferences at the district level by electing repre­
sentatives. Then, a centralized policy is enacted by legislation if a majority of the district 
representatives approves. 
Our aim is to identify which of these two types of referendum procedures is more 
favorable to centralization under the assumption that there is a very large number of 
equal size districts, as in 2.3.1 with N set equal to +oo. In this case a d = 0 for all d and 
furthermore µ= 0. From equation (2) individuals whose types satisfy 
will vote for centralization. Let 
2 l +ad2t < -· -­- 2 + O"J
1 + O"J 
2 + O"J . 
The proportion of individuals of district d whose types lie in the interval [-t*(ad), +t*(ad)] 
is 
The district will approve centralization if this proportion is at least equal to 1/2, that is 
if 
(5) 
This expression defines a limit value m(ad) such that a district will vote for centralization 
if and only if its median lies in the interval [-m(ad), +m(ad)], and the proportion of 
districts that approve centralization is therefore 
From the discussion in 2.3.1, the percentage of voters in the aggregate who approve 
of centralization is 
2<I> (./ ) -1.
2 + O"J 
Therefore the proportion of districts that will approve centralization is greater than 
the proportion of voters who will if 
9 
Figure 1: Proportions of districts and voters voting for centralization as a function of O"J, 
under sophisticated voting with a continuum of districts The thicker curve indicates the 
proportion of districts, the thinner line the proportion of voters. They intersect for 
O'J � 3.032. The curves stay very close to each other for large a�. When it is equal
to 100, the proportion of districts is 7.38%, the proportion o(agents 7.89%. 
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which, from the definition of m( (j d) is equivalent to 
3 3.5 variance 
Numerical computations show that this inequality holds if O'J ::; 3. Figure 1 shows the
proportion of districts and of voters that approve centralization, as a function of O'J. 
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3.2 Optional Confederations
Up to this point, we have assumed that the centralized policy, if adopted, is the median 
ideal point of all individuals in all districts. This carries with it the implicit assumption 
that all districts are forced to adopt the same policy and that this policy is somehow 
decided by majority rule applied to the union as a whole. A natural alternative would 
be that the centralized policy would be binding only on those districts who have ratified 
centralization, and that the others adopt the policy preferred by their median voters. A 
similar "opt-out" rule was used to decide membership in the Confederation of Independ­
ent States of the former Soviet Union. Another version was also used for ratification of 
the U.S. constitution, where nine of -the thirteeri original states were needed for ratifi­
cation to be successful, and any state voting against ratification was excluded from the 
union.6 
Using the framework with many districts introduced in section 2.3:1, we present 
three different models of voting behavior, which differ in the degree of sophistication 
that is assumed on the part of voters, degree of sophistication on which the equilibrium 
solutions depends crucially. For each of these models, we identify two intervals centered 
around O, one is the interval of types of voters who will vote for centralization, the second 
contains the median of district types for those districts where a majority of voters choose 
centralization. Because these intervals are centered around 0 the policy chosen by the 
districts who join the confederation will be 0. Of course, each district that does not join 
will choose the policy preferred by its median voter. 
naive voters: A voter ( t, d) votes for centralization if
E [(t -md)2lt] � t2.
The right hand side is the disutility of the voter under centralization; the left hand 
side is the expected disutility under decentralization, when the voter does not take 
into account the fact that his district will vote for decentralization only if the 
median of its types is far from 0. 
It is easy to see that the voters are making exactly the same reasoning that in 3.1, 
and the analysis can be adapted . 
. semi naive voters: Districts whose district median lies outside the interval [ -msn, msn] 
stay out of the confederation. A voter (t, d) votes for centralization if the expected
value of (t -md)2 conditional on the fact that he is of type t and on the fact that
the inequality 
6In contrast, ratification of the constitution of the Fifth Republic of France required a majority of 
voters in a nationwide referendum, as in the analysis of section 2.
Nearly universally, amendment ratification does not have an opt-out provision. For example, in the 
U.S. ratification of amendments requires appoval by two thirds of the states in the union, rather than 
some majority or supramajority of voters in a national referendum: These amendments are binding on 
all states. The exact procedures vary across countries. 
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holds is greater than t 2, his utility under centralization. 
For the sake of brevity, we will not study this case in detail. 
sophisticated voters: These voters only take into account in their choice of votes the 
cases where they will be pivotal. We analyze this case in detail below. 
To study tise equilibrium with sophisticated voters, we look for an equilibrium with 
the following characteristics7: 
. 
• there exits a cutoff type t � 0 such that a voter votes for centralization if and only
if his ideal policy lies in the interval [-f, +t].
• there exists a cutoff district median d � 0 such that the majority. of agents of a
district vote for decentralization if and only if the median of their ideal policies lie
in the interval [-d, +d]. Therefore exactly 50 percenj;_Qf the voters of the district
with median d will choose centralization. · 
• individuals choose their votes conditional on the fact that they belong to a one of
the boundary districts, that is a district with median d or -d. Indeed, this is the
only case in which their vote can make a difference.
Because exactly half the agents who live in a marginal .district vote for centralization, 
by a reasoning similar to the one that lead to equation (5), we must have 
<P(t--: d) + <P(t + d) = 3/2. (6) 
The second condition that we must derive states that an agent of type t is indifferent 
between voting for centralization and decentralization. His vote will make a difference if 
and only if the median of his district is either d or -d. Let /3 be the probability that he 
assigns to the fact that it is d (we will compute /3 later). We must have 
p = /3(d -t) 2 + (1 -/3)(d + t)2. (7) 
Because of the symmetry of the equilibrium, the districts that belong to the confederation 
will choose policy O, and therefore the left hand side represents the utility of the agent if 
7We ignore deliberately some difficult 1ssues. ·For example, there clearly exist multiple equilibria: 
unanimous votes either for centralization or decentralization are clearly equilibria. Also, the identification 
of a "pivotal voter" in the context of a model with a continuum of voters is questionable. For the 
purposes of this paper, we feel that the definition that we present is intuitive and enables us to discuss 
some interesting issues. A compiete analysis with a finite number of voters is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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his district joins it. The right hand side represents his disutility derived from a vote for 
decentralization. Equation (7) implies 
- d 
t 
= 2(2,B - 1)' (8) 
We are left with the task of computing ,B, that is the conditional probability of 
belonging to the district of median d given that the agent is of type t and belongs either 
to a district of median d or to a district of median -d. Given the distribution of d
conditional on t described in 2.2, we get 
,B 
(9) . .. · 
where ¢ is the density of the unit normal distribution. The simplification that yields 
equation (9) is due to the exponential natl.ire of¢.
Solving the system of equations (6), (8) and (9) we obtain 
t � 0.714 
d � 0.339. 
Note that t and d are independent of uJ. This imply that the proportion of voters 
and of districts that vote for centralization decrease when uJ increases. 
4 Extensions 
In this section, we consider two extensions of our basic model. 
4.1 Multiple independent issues
Often, centralization or confederation involves loss of sovereignty by each member-district 
in several policy domains. This is true, for example in the case of the Maastrict agreement, 
and is obviously true in national confederations such as. the U.S. and Canada. 
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Assume therefore that the constitutional vote bears on the appropriate level of cen­
tralization for a very large number K of issues. An individual has a vector of ideal points 
t = (ti, ... , tK) · If the vector of policies is x = (xi, ... , XK) his utility will be
1 K 
U(x; t) = -
K 
'E(xk -tk)2.
k=l 
We assume that the ideal points over different issues are distributed independently8 from
each other by a process identical to that described in section 2. 
Since the distribution of ideal points is radially symmetric, a global median exists, 
and therefore majority rule outcomes on issues are well defined. For an agent with ideal 
point t the disutility of centralization is 
The disutility of decentralization is 
1 a2 1 K t2 
K 
'EE [(dk -tk)21tk] = aJ � 1
+(aJ+1)2 {; ;,
where we write dk for the median ideal point on issue kin the district of the agent.
By the law of large numbers as K becomes very large the expected disutility of 
centralization converges to aJ + 1 and the expected disutility of decentralization ·converges 
to 1. In the limit, as the number of issues become very large, decentralization is preferred 
by every agent. A practical requirement of unification is to avoid bundling too many 
disparate issues together, or perhaps to decide sequentially which issues should have 
centralized policies. 
On the other hand, issues over which one would expect ideal points to be highly 
correlated (such as agricultural policies for different crops or products) could be bundled 
without making ratification of centralized policies impossible. Alternatively, to the extent 
that a few key policy dimensions permit a close approximation of policy preferences over 
a multitude of specific issues (as is often claimed by political scientists), a large number 
of issues would not automatically imply unanimous opposition to centralization. 
4.2 Uncertainty about preferences
Up to this point, we have assumed that the agents know perfectly their own ideal point. In 
reality, votes over federation take place when the agents have imperfect information about 
8 At the other extreme, if ideal points are perfectly correlated acl'oss issues then nothing changes from 
the analysis of the last section. 
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the policies or even the issues to be decided in the future. In order to study this issue, 
we will use the infinite number of egl!�L�ize dist;_rict§�moc:le1 (as in 2.3.1 with N = +oo), 
and assume that the voters observe their ideal point with a Normally distributed error 1:. 
More precisely the agent ( t, d) observes
l = t+E, 
where t: is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance O'; . 
The variables (d, t, l) are jointly normally.distributed with.mean (0, 0, 0) and variance­
covariance matrix 
O'J J O'J + 1 .O'J + (J'; + 1 
Using once again the results discussed in De Groot, we find that conditional on l, the
variables (md, t) are jointly normally distributed with mean
and variance 
We obtain9 
E [ (md - t)2 ll] 
- var [mdll] +var [tjl] + (E [mdll] - E [tjl])2 (10) 
-2E [(md - E [mdjl])(t - E [tjl])ll]
0'2 + 0'2 12 
O'J � (J'; � 1 + (O'J + (J'; + 1)2' 
(11) 
and similarly 
E [t2ll] = O';(O'J + 1) + (O'J + 1)
2 
12.0'2 + 0'2 + 1 (0'2 + 0'2 + 1)2 d € d € • •  
�������������-
9 We do not condition on the name of the district d because all districts are similar. 
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It is then easy to show that a voter prefers decentralization if and only if 
12 (1 - u;) - > -'----.....;;..;_. <TJ - 2 + (}"� . 
This implies the following: 
Proposition 3 An increase in the uncertainty over preferences, u; , increases the pro­
portion of voters that prefer decentralization. If o:; is greater that the variance of types 
within a district, all agents pref er decentralization. 
The intuition for this result is that on average voters can expect to be .closer to their 
own district median than to the median of the whole. Consider the extreme case, where 
the variance of the error term is very large so that a voter has no information about 
his preferences. Then, every voter prefers decentralization since the expected squared 
distance from his type to the median of his district is less than its expected squared 
distance from the overall median. This is mathematically equivalent to the many issue 
case analyzed in 4.2, where the actual distribution of a voter's realized ideal points is 
asymptotically equal to the ex ante distribution of ideal points. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
We have e�plored a model of induced vbter preterences over . a decision to centralize 
policymaking. In the uninteresting extreme case (the ex post situation) where voters 
know everything, the model reduces to the standard one, where the median voter in 
every district obviously prefers the median of his own district to the median of the 
whole and centralization cannot arise as a majority rule equilibrium. In the general case, 
the main theme underlying the derivation of these induced preferences is that voters 
have incomplete information about preferences of other voters, and therefore view the 
outcomes of political processes as random variables. However, subsection 4.2 shows that 
if the voters have no private information about the median of their own district (the ex 
ante case), centralization never prevails. 
But in the broad intermediate range (the interim case), where voters know more about 
their own preferences than they know about other voters' preferences, while not having 
perfect information, a much richer set of possibilities emerges. It is possible for a majority 
of voters in the union of all districts to prefer centralization even though it is common 
knowledge that the median voter in every district will ex post prefer decentralization. 
This is true because all voters can expect the centralized policy to be more moderate. 
We call this the "principle of moderation." An immediate implication is that centraliza­
tion decisions will inevitably pit the middle against the extremes, with moderate voters 
favoring centralization and extremists on both wings favoring decentralization. We also 
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show that it is even easier for a majority of voters in a majority of districts to prefer 
centralization, which suggests that the actual procedures of aggregating preferences at 
different levels, perhaps through regional representative institutions like legislatures and 
parliaments, are likely to have systematic effects in a movement toward more centralized 
government policies. We call this the "principle of aggregation." 
Our model could be extended in a number of directions. One obvious direction is 
to extend the results to alternative aggregation procedures for deciding over centralized 
policies. We considered majority rule procedures, other possibilities exist. 
Another extension would be to investigate dynamic issues . . Just as is it possible for a 
collection of districts to centralize policies, it is also possible for the reverse to happen. 
As information about policies and district preferences becomes better known over time, 
the median voter of each district will have incentives to organize a "secession" of that 
district from the centralized policies. Thus, it may make sense to have asymmetries (such 
as supramajority requirements to amend a constitution) built into procedures to reverse 
earlier decisions to centralize. Without some such devices to "commit" to a centralized 
policy (including the possible use of force by a central authority), it would be very difficult 
to avoid the problem of secession, and decisions to centralize might be quite unstable. 
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